Background: Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payments are one of the major sources of financial support for hospitals providing care to low-income patients. However, Medicaid DSH payments will be redirected from hospitals to subsidize individual health insurance purchase through US national health reform.
T he Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) program is a major funding source that offsets hospitals' financial burdens for providing care to the low-income population. However, in 1997, the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) limited Medicaid DSH payments by reducing statespecific federal allotments by $10.4 billion over the period of 1998-2003. 1, 2 These substantial Medicaid DSH reductions represented the major sources of federal BBA Medicaid savings, specifically accounting for 61% of the total Medicaid gross savings over 5 years. 2 Little is known about whether these reductions in Medicaid DSH payments were associated with changes in hospital quality of care for lowincome populations. Understanding how DSH payment reductions affected quality of care is important because the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010 will implement sharp Medicaid DSH reductions so that these funds can be used instead to subsidize individual health insurance purchase and expand coverage nationally. [3] [4] [5] Under ACA, hospitals will begin to lose Medicaid DSH payment funding in 2014. These DSH reductions could create financial pressures for safety-net hospitals that currently provide a large share of care to low-income populations even if health insurance coverage increases, because the residual uninsured will likely continue to rely on these facilities and the newly insured individuals may seek care elsewhere. [5] [6] [7] [8] Of great concern is that payment cutbacks will reduce the quality of patient care. [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] Economic theory predicts that hospitals, when confronted with financial pressure as a result of payment reductions, reduce their quality of care because they have fewer resources to invest in the processes of care, new health care technology, and aging hospital infrastructure. [16] [17] [18] [19] Furthermore, many researchers have argued that the effect of cutbacks from a given payer may affect quality of care for patients with other payers because quality of care may be viewed as a public good. 13, 16, 19, 20 Specifically, as a public good, there are substantial commonalities (ie, the same health care professionals and facilities) in a hospital that affect quality for all types of patients. 16, 20 In contrast, if quality is a private good, hospitals may be able to distinguish profitable and unprofitable patients and provide different levels of quality given patients' payer status.
Several studies have investigated the effect of payment changes on hospital quality of care for Medicaid and uninsured patients specifically, but the evidence has been mixed. 9, 14, 16, 21, 22 Only 2 studies focused on the effect of Medicaid DSH payment programs on quality. Duggan 23 examined the extent to which increasing hospital DSH payments from California's Medi-Cal DSH program in 1990 affected infant mortality at the zip code level, and found that public subsidies did not improve infant mortality. Baicker and Staiger 24 studied the impact of Medicaid DSH spending on infant mortality and postheart attack mortality in California at the county level between the periods of 1988-1990 and 1998-2000 and found little net impact on patient care. However, neither of these studies examined how individual hospitals responded to changes in Medicaid DSH payments. In addition, previous studies were limited to the elderly or young children and did not examine the potential effects among patients with other types of payers. Our study addresses these gaps among existing studies.
The purpose of this study is to examine how Medicaid DSH payment cuts affected hospital quality of care in California using data from 1996 to 2003, a period which spans preimplementation and postimplementation of the BBA in 1997. We evaluated this relationship at the individual hospital level, which is a more natural unit of analysis for reporting on and improving accountability. The State of California was selected for 2 reasons: first, California has a high uninsured rate and thus received relatively large amounts of Medicaid DSH payments; second, California was substantially affected by the BBA, with its state-specific federal Medicaid DSH allotment declining from $1085 million in 1998 to $890 million in 2003 (supplementary digital eFigure 1 and 2, Supplemental Digital Content 1, http://links.lww.com/MLR/ A693). 1, 25 Given the data we examined, the overall change in the total net Medicaid revenue per Medicaid/indigent discharge is À 8.4% between 1998 and 2003. This combines a net Medicaid revenue per discharge increase of 6.4% with a decline in Medicaid DSH payments of À 75.5%. We focused on the quality of care for Medicaid and uninsured patients because these groups are likely affected by the Medicaid DSH payment reductions. Specifically, according to the federal requirement and California state regulation, Medicaid DSH subsidies are distributed to hospitals with high levels of Medicaid and uninsured inpatient utilization. 26 We also study the quality of care for privately insured patients to examine whether the DSH reductions had any spillover effects given the economic arguments about the potential public good nature of hospital quality of care.
METHODS

Data Sources
We used 8 years (1996-2003) of longitudinal unbalanced panel data for California hospitals to assess our research question. Several data sources were used for this study. The Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) State Inpatient Data (SID) for California were used to construct hospital quality indicators. The Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD) in California provided state-audited hospital financial statements and hospital all-payer case-mix index data. The American Hospital Association Annual Survey provided data on the hospital characteristics. The Area Resource File provided demographic information among communities. Health Leader-Interstudy data on Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) enrollment at the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) level were also used. The Medi-Cal annual statistical report was accessed to obtain statistical data on the California Medi-Cal program services, expenditures, and eligibles. The Medi-Cal Managed Care Annual Statistical Report was also used to obtain information about the managed care programs rendering care to Medi-Cal beneficiaries. Finally, the Medicare CMS-2552-96 cost report provided data on the Medicare DSH payments that hospitals received.
Sample Criteria
The California SID dataset was used for constructing risk-adjusted hospital-level quality measures. It contained 30,395,971 inpatient discharges from 1996 to 2003. We excluded discharges for those who: were younger than 18 or older than 64 years (n = 16,030,336); were enrolled in Medicare (n = 1,605,701); stayed in the hospital longer than 30 days (n = 124,986); were residents of a state other than California (n = 311,915); were discharged alive in <1 day (these patients either were miscoded or had conditions not requiring a hospital stay) (n = 356,807); or had specific exclusions (ie, sex variable is missing or with erroneous data) (n = 670,498). The final sample included 11,295,728 inpatient discharges. Overall, privately insured individuals represent about 55% of these inpatient discharges, with the remainder being Medicaid/uninsured.
The hospitals included in the study were short-term, nonfederal general acute care hospitals. We eliminated 25 Kaiser hospitals in each study year because they do not report data to OSPHD. In addition, we excluded hospitals that experienced ownership changes (ie, hospital closure or ownership conversion) during the study years because these changes could affect hospital care to low-income individuals and, thus, the amount of Medicaid DSH payments they received, which resulted in about 8% of hospitals being excluded. Finally, there were 2279 hospital-year observations, representing 318 hospitals that had at least 2 annual observations for each payer type. The distribution of hospital-year observations between 1996 and 2003 is listed in the supplementary eTable 1, Supplemental Digital Content 1, http://links.lww.com/MLR/ A693. California hospitals that provided a high volume of care to low-income and uninsured patients are eligible to receive Medicaid DSH payments and were defined as DSH hospitals. Between 1996 and 2003, 129 hospitals received Medicaid DSH payments in 2 or more of our study years.
Variable Definitions Quality of Care Measures
We used patient safety indicators (PSIs) and inpatient quality indicators (IQIs) software available at the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (http//:www.quality indicators.ahrq.gov) to construct hospital-level, risk-adjusted patient quality indicators for privately insured and Medicaid/ uninsured patients separately. For each hospital, risk-adjusted PSIs and IQIs controlled for patient age, sex, modified diagnosis-related group (DRG), and 30 comorbidities. 27, 28 Given concern that payment reductions may affect staffing levels at hospitals because hospitals cut back on labor inputs in response to financial pressure, 29-32 9 nursing-sensitive patient safety and inpatient quality indicators were created. The California legislature passed Assembly Bill 394 (AB394) mandating minimum licensed nurse-to-patient ratios in October 1999, but this law was not implemented until January 2004 [33] [34] [35] and should not influence our findings. These 9 indicators were death in low-mortality DRGs (PSI02), pressure ulcer (PSI03), selected infections due to medical care (PSI07), postoperative hemorrhage or hematoma rate (PSI09), postoperative pulmonary embolism or deep vein thrombosis rate (PSI12), acute myocardial infarction mortality (IQI15), congestive heart failure mortality (IQI16), acute stroke mortality (IQI17), and pneumonia mortality (IQI20). [36] [37] [38] In addition, given the fact that childbirth is the leading reason privately insured and lowincome women are hospitalized, 39 2 birth-related PSIs were examined: obstetric trauma-vaginal birth with use of an instrument (PSI18) and obstetric trauma-vaginal birth without use of an instrument (PSI19).
Medicaid DSH Payments
In California, a hospital is eligible for a Medicaid DSH payment when it meets 1 of 2 criteria: (1) the hospital's number of Medi-Cal inpatient days are at least 1 SD above the statewide mean; (2) the hospital's revenues from lowincome patient utilization (including Medi-Cal and uncompensated care) account for 25% or more of its total revenues. 25, 26 The State of California collects money from hospitals in the form of Intergovernmental Transfers (IGTs) that are then matched with federal Medicaid matching funds. Thus, it is necessary to calculate net Medicaid DSH as the amount of Medicaid DSH payments that a hospital received lesser the amount of funds collected by the state through IGTs. 40 We obtained DSH and IGT data from hospital annual audited financial report data published by the OSHPD in California. Our constructed Medicaid DSH measure equals net Medicaid DSH divided by the hospital's average charge per admission. This measure can be considered as the number of low-income patients the hospital can treat given its net Medicaid DSH payments and its average charge per patient in a year. It also controls for inflation because both DSH and charges in a year are affected by inflation. After the terminology adopted by Gaskin, 41 we named this variable as net Medicaid DSH admissions.
Other Governmental Subsides
To isolate the impact of the decline in Medicaid DSH payments on hospital patient safety quality, we controlled for 2 other subsidies that hospitals receive to cover the unreimbursed costs of care for Medicaid and uninsured patients. One is governmental subsidies for Medicare DSH payments, and the other is the state and local governmental financial support. The latter includes state and county tax appropriations, restricted donations, and subsides for indigent care and subsidies for district hospitals. These values are rescaled in the same manner as the Medicaid DSH payment variable. 25 
Market Characteristics
Controls are necessary for several market factors that may affect hospitals' quality of care. These factors include Medicaid eligibility, Medicaid managed care, the prevalence of public and teaching hospital beds, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), private HMO managed care penetration, median household income, and unemployment rate at the county level. Medicaid eligibility is the ratio of the number of average monthly Medi-Cal eligible individuals to the total population and Medicaid managed care is the ratio of the number of Medicaid managed care enrollees to the total population in the county. A HHI is used to measure the degree of hospital competition within a given market. It is calculated as the sum of squared of market shares for each hospital in a county based on the number of admissions to that hospital. The HHI takes high values (with a maximum of 1), if there are few hospital competitors in a market and takes low values (approaching 0) if many competitors are present. If hospitals are in the same multihospital system within a county, their hospital admissions were combined and treated as if the system were 1 organization. The percentage of public hospital beds was measured as the number of county and district hospital beds divided by total hospitals beds, and the percentage of teaching hospital beds was measured as the number of teaching hospital beds divided by the total hospital beds within a county.
Hospital Characteristics
Several hospital characteristics were controlled in the model, including: hospital ownership, system affiliation, teaching status, hospital size, the ratio of registered nurses to hospital staff beds, and the number of high-tech services as identified by Bazzoli et al. 42 Hospital all-payer case-mix was included because hospitals treating patients with more severe illnesses may experience greater number of adverse patient events due to the more complex patient population. 43, 44 In addition, year dummy variables were included to identify the study years, with the year of 1996 in the referent category.
Empirical Approach
Hospital-level quality of care measures are examined based on the payer category of discharged patients (ie, Medicaid/uninsured and privately insured). The empirical specification for the analysis is represented by the following reduced form equation:
where i is an individual hospital; k the selected quality indicators; p the payer; t the year. DSH it is net Medicaid DSH This empirical model allows us to examine the impact of the reduction in Medicaid DSH payments on hospital quality for both Medicaid/uninsured and privately insured patients. Specifically, the estimated coefficient of DSH (ie, g 1 ) represents the DSH effect on quality of care for the privately insured patients and the sum of this coefficient and the coefficient to DSH Â PAYER (ie, g 1 +g 2 ) represents the total effect for Medicaid/uninsured patients. In addition, a heteroskedasticity-robust standard error adjustment was used and also clustered by hospitals to take account of unequal error variances across hospitals. Table 1 reports the number of hospitals and hospitalyears, the average of quality performance for a given indicator for privately insured individuals and Medicaid/uninsured individuals at the hospital level between1996 and 2003, and the P-value from a paired t test between 2 groups of patients. IQIs and PSIs measure negative quality events. Therefore, higher numbers imply poorer quality of care. For example, the average value of PSI02 is 0.00024 for the privately insured and is 0.00031 for Medicaid/uninsured. These numbers imply that Medicaid/uninsured patients had on an average 0.7 additional PSI02 adverse events per 1000 discharges when compared with privately insured patients. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on hospital and market characteristics for DSH hospitals and non-DSH hospitals between 1996 and 2003. Compared with non-DSH hospitals, DSH hospitals tended to receive more other governmental financial support (P < 0.01), have larger bed size (P < 0.01), be more involved in teaching (P < 0.01), be more likely to be located in counties with a high ratio of Medicaid eligible to total population (P < 0.01), have a higher ratio of Medicaid managed care enrollees to total population (P < 0.01), be in a more competitive market (P < 0.01), have a greater percentage of public and teaching hospitals in a county (P < 0.05 and <0.01, respectively), and be in a county with a lower median household income (P < 0.01) and with a higher unemployment rate (P < 0.05). Table 3 provides the coefficients for each quality measure for private insured (g 1 ) and Medicaid/uninsured (g 1+ g 2 ) groups, extracted from the multivariate fixed-effects model (supplementary eTable 2, Supplemental Digital Content 1, http://links.lww.com/MLR/A693). Although the coefficients for most of the quality measures are insignificant, we observe significant findings (P < 0.1) on PSI02 and PQI16 for the privately insured and on PSI16 for the Medicaid/ uninsured (P < 0.1), indicating that greater DSH payments reduced the probability of low-mortality DRGs and congestive heart failure (CHF) deaths for privately insured patients and the rate of CHF deaths for Medicaid and uninsured patients.
RESULTS
To put the magnitude of these responses into perspective, it is worthwhile to examine the elasticity of hospital responses, namely the percentage change in quality of care associated with a percentage change in the net Medicaid DSH variable. We used IQI16 for Medicaid/uninsured as an example and calculated an elasticity using the mean value of IQI16 for Medicaid/uninsured patients in Table 1 , the mean value of net Medicaid DSH admissions in Table 2 , and the marginal effect estimates based on the results in Table 3 . Our study findings imply that a one-unit change in the net Medicaid DSH variable equaled 0.16% reduction in net Medicaid DSH (ie, 1 divided by 607.96) and this was associated with a 0.0087% (ie, 1 divided by 0.02254 and then multiplied by 0.000196 and divided by 100) increase in hospital rate of CHF deaths for Medicaid/uninsured. This implies that the elasticity of hospital quality of care for this IQI to a net Medicaid DSH change was À 0.054. Overall, these results suggest an inelastic and small hospital response to declining Medicaid DSH payments.
For a sensitivity analysis, we assumed that a hospital determines the level of quality of care to provide in time period t based on the pool of resources available to it in the prior period t À 1 rather than the current period t. The results we obtained using lagged Medicaid DSH effects were similar to those obtained using current Medicaid DSH effects in that few of the effects were found to be significant and those that were suggested only a small effect on the quality indicators (as listed in the supplementary eTable 3, Supplemental Digital Content 1, http://links.lww.com/MLR/A693).
DISCUSSION
With the number of uninsured expected to drop, the ACA initiates a series of payment reductions, such as those planned for reducing Medicaid DSH payments by a total of $18.1 billion between 2014 and 2020. 6 This DSH payment reduction could create a substantial financial shortfall for safety-net hospitals. The present study applied economic theory of hospital behavior as a framework to examine whether hospitals change their quality of care for both privately insured and low-income patients when their Medicaid DSH payments declined. Nine nursing-sensitive and 2 birthrelated hospital quality indicators were examined using data from California hospitals from 1996 to 2003. Despite the strong theoretical predictions, our overall study findings provide little evidence that hospital quality of care declined for either Medicaid/uninsured or privately insured patients in California. Although we found a few quality measures that had a significant relationship with DSH payment cut, the magnitude of those effects was very small.
There are several potential explanations for these findings. First, even though Medicaid DSH subsidies declined, hospitals may have been able to maintain sufficient business revenues so that they did not need to reduce resources devoted to quality of care. 45, 46 Second, hospitals may need to keep their core clinical care at sufficiently high quality to maintain their reputation and to attract paying patients. Thus, they may take actions to sustain quality of care despite DSH reductions. 47 Third, even though California implemented regulations requiring minimum levels of licensed nurse staffing after our study period (eg, beginning in 2004), [33] [34] [35] hospitals may have anticipated this new regulation. Therefore, rather than cutting back on labor inputs in response to DSH payment reductions, hospitals may have maintained or increased their nurse staffing and as a result, quality of care was not affected. Fourth, hospitals may take actions that affect other dimensions of their activities when faced with financial pressure to ensure they have sufficient internal resources to support quality of care. Specifically, they may instead decide to reduce the volume of care for Medicaid/uninsured patients although such action may in turn affect the future subsidies they can obtain for caring this group of patients. 25 As with any study, this research has limitations that must be acknowledged. First, this study only examined hospitals in California. The results may not be generalizable to other states. Second, the data used to construct quality measures (ie, PSIs and IQIs) were based on hospital administrative data. We were not able to observe posthospitalization mortality because it is not available in HCUP-SID datasets. In addition, we used SID data from 1996 to 2003 to construct PSIs and IQIs. From prior research, 48 it is clear that PSIs may be substantially affected when the present on admission indicators are used. However, these data lacked of this information because the present on admission data were collected since 2007. Even so, our results still indicate Medicaid DSH payments have little effect on the quality of care. Third, our analysis excluded hospitals that closed during the study period; if DSH payment reductions were a primary factor in these closures, we may be underestimating the effects of DSH reductions on quality of care. Fourth, while we used 8 years of data, the specification we estimated only focused on the short-term effect for the impact that changes in DSH in 1 year have upon quality in that year.
Despite its shortcomings, the study results do provide important implications. This study examined the association between changes in Medicaid DSH payments resulting from the 1997 BBA policy and hospital quality of care. Through this study, we can gain knowledge of the effects of health policies and have better ability to anticipate the potential effects of future policies on health outcomes. With respect to the 2010 US health care reform law, the ACA includes provisions that would redirect Medicaid and Medicare DSH payments to provide subsidies for individual health insurance purchase. Our findings suggest that this change, which will result in declining hospital DSH payments, should have little effect on the quality of care for hospitalized patients. However, our findings do not account for the array of additional changes that hospitals will confront as the new health reform law is implemented and thus more study of potential quality of care changes is needed. 
